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Abstract		
Across  the disciplinary  frontiers of  the  social  sciences,  studies by  social  scientists  treating 
their  own  investigative  practices  as  sites  of  empirical  inquiry  have  proliferated. Most  of 
these  studies  have  been  retrospective,  historical,  after‐the‐fact  reconstructions  of  social 
scientific  studies  mixing  interview  data  with  the  (predominantly  textual)  traces  that 
investigations leave behind. Observational studies of in situ work in social science research 
are, however, relatively scarce. 
 
Ethnomethodology was an early and prominent attempt to treat social science methodology 
as a topic for sociological investigations and, in this paper, we draw out what we see as its 
distinctive  contribution:  namely,  a  focus  on  troubles  as  features  of  the  in  situ,  practical 
accomplishment of method,  in particular,  the way  that  research outcomes are  shaped by 
the  local practices  of  investigators  in  response  to  the  troubles  they  encounter  along  the 
way. Based on  two case  studies, we distinguish methodological  troubles as problems and 
methodological  troubles  as phenomena  to be  studied,  and  suggest  the  latter  orientation 
provides an alternate starting point for addressing social scientists’ investigative practices. 
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Introduction	
Over the last two decades, and across the disciplinary boundaries of the social sciences, 
studies by social scientists treating their own investigative practices as sites of empirical 
inquiry have proliferated. This trend towards disciplinary self-study, i.e. studies of social 
scientists by social scientists, has intensified with work, inter alia, on the sociology of social 
scientific knowledge (Maynard and Schaeffer 2000; Leahey 2008), genealogical histories of 
social research techniques (Abbot 2001; Osborne, Rose, and Savage 2008), studies of the 
production of ‘social knowledge’ (Camic, Gross, and Lamont 2011; Saetnan, Lomell, and 
Hammer 2011), and investigations of ‘the social life of methods’ (Law, Ruppert, and Savage 
2011; Savage 2013). Consequently, we now have studies of, for example, social science 
infrastructures and disciplinary lineages (Abbott 2001), the survey (Law 2009; Osborne and 
Rose 1999), the census (Ruppert 2007), the interview (Briggs 2007; Savage 2010), the map 
and the model (Osborne and Rose 2004), the art of measurement and statistical manipulation 
(Espeland and Stevens 2008; Saetnan, Lomell, and Hammer 2011), fieldwork (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997; Gieryn 2006), as well as of processes of professional review, judgment and 
evaluation (Lamont 2009; Camic, Gross, and Lamont 2011).  
 
It would be misleading to construe these as signifying a problematic introversion, indicative 
of malaise, paralysis or crisis (though an element of this is perhaps in play, see Savage and 
Burrows 2007). Not only does this work reflect growing interest in practices and techniques 
of knowledge making in social and cultural life more broadly, and not just science and 
administration (see Majima and Moore 2009; Benzecry and Krause 2010), it also reflects 
dissatisfaction with programmatic doctrinal statements of the aims of the social sciences 
wedded to meta-reflection, critique and inter- and intra-disciplinary jostling and one-
upmanship. Rather than using idealized conceptions of social science as decontextualized 
standards to judge what social scientists do, the focus has been on understanding the scale, 
range and diversity of the social sciences practical entanglements in social and cultural life, 
showing that the social sciences do not merely record, but are productive, helping to bring 
into being and stabilize the very phenomena they depict, thereby establishing open-ended, co-
constitutive, reflexive and recursive relationships between what is studied and how (Lury and 
Wakeford 2012). Subject matter and method, on this reading, are thoroughly interdependent 
and mutually insinuating. 
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The interest in examining the work of social fact production has not, however, translated into 
many direct studies of social scientists at work and their ‘logics of practice’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992). The studies discussed above are mainly retrospective, historical, after-the-
fact reconstructions of social scientific studies assembled out of interview data, where 
available, and the (predominantly) textual-archival traces such investigations leave behind. 
While we take no issue with these approaches to ‘problems’ of method, we believe that 
investigations of in situ work in social science research, i.e., equivalents of the ‘laboratory 
studies’ of the natural sciences (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Lynch 1985) and mathematics 
(Greiffenhagen 2008, 2014), can provide a useful counterpart, indeed counterpoint, to them. 
Compared to the flourishing body of retrospective, historical-genealogical, and exegetical 
research that has been and is currently being conducted, however, there are far fewer studies 
of this kind.  
 
The few observational studies of social scientists at work that have been conducted have 
largely focused on the interactional organisation of the interview, due primarily to its status 
as one of the lynchpins of social research both inside and outside the academic social 
sciences (Silverman 1973; Suchman and Jordan 1990; Maynard and Schaeffer 2000; 
Maynard et al. 2002; Roulston, DeMarrais and Lewis 2003). Beyond this, there have also 
been, for example, studies of ‘data sessions’ (Olszewski, Macey and Lindstrom 2007; Antaki 
et al. 2008; Tutt and Hindmarsh 2011; Bushnell 2012), ‘coding’ (Goodwin 1994; Olszewski, 
Macey and Lindstrom 2007; Housley and Smith 2011), the scrutiny work of social science 
review boards (Stark 2011) and examinations of ‘analysis’ (Konopasek 2008; Garforth 2012; 
and see Mair, Greiffenhagen and Sharrock 2013 for a more comprehensive overview of this 
area of research as a whole). 
 
In ethnomethodology both these strands of inquiry are brought together: how a general 
interest in the role of method in the social sciences leads into studies of the practical 
achievements of both lay and professional sociological reasoning, has been a, if not the, 
central concern of ethnomethodology. In what follows, we therefore want to draw out what 
we see as the distinctive contribution of ethnomethodology to research in this area: namely, a 
focus on troubles as features of the in situ, practical accomplishment of method. 
Ethnomethodology retains an ongoing commitment to demonstrations of the specific ways 
research outcomes are shaped by the local practices of investigators in response to the 
troubles they encounter along the way. For ethnomethodology, troubles are normal in any 
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practice, including the social sciences, but it is the distinctive forms they take from setting to 
setting that are of interest, providing wider insights into the practices in question. Put simply, 
to learn about troubles is to learn about the practices they are normal to.  
 
Before going on to empirical studies of two specific cases, in the next section we want to 
outline the ethnomethodological interest in troubles in more depth. Our aim in doing so is less 
in contributing to debates on how sociological method might ‘properly’ be conceived, 
independently of what sociologists routinely get up to, than in contributing to contemporary 
debates on how ‘methods work’ might be studied – in saying something to those with an 
interest in sociological practice as a topic of empirical inquiry. In that sense, while we 
acknowledge the wider meta-analytical debates such work touches upon, as in debates about, 
e.g., the role method ought to play in the social sciences or the standards by which research 
ought to be judged – themselves perennial, unresolved and perhaps unresolvable sources of 
dispute – our concerns here are of a much more limited kind; namely, in what ways are 
sociological practices investigable? And it is in responding to this question that we think 
ethnomethodology has something valuable to offer, particularly in relation to a growing body 
of empirical studies of method that as yet shows limited awareness of how ethnomethodology 
might be relevant to its concerns. 
Ethnomethodology	and	troubles	of	method		
That ethnomethodology should take an interest in the investigative work of social scientists 
may come as a surprise to many. Ethnomethodology, particularly Garfinkel’s articulation of 
it, our primary focus herei, is generally thought of as being profoundly sceptical about the 
social sciences, and is often associated with a series of arguments designed to demonstrate 
the impossibility of sociological research (Atkinson 1988: 450). There are several (not 
entirely undeserved) reasons as to why ethnomethodology has gained a reputation for being 
querulous and troublesome, particularly in relation to sociology, but matters are not as simple 
as they might first appear. As a way of setting the stage for the discussion that follows, we 
will concentrate on two aspects of ethnomethodology’s take on the social sciences here. 
 
The first aspect is the steadfast refusal to privilege sociological perspectives on the social 
world. In treating ‘sociological reasoning’ as a ubiquitous feature of everyday life, Garfinkel 
was not seeking to elevate sociology to the status of a universal science but to undermine 
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attempts to draw a line of demarcation between sociological analyses and ordinary forms of 
practical reasoning by showing their thoroughly ‘vulgar’ grounding (Sharrock 2001; Lynch 
2000). For Garfinkel, sociological reasoning, lay or professional, constituted a vernacular 
accomplishment, one which was embedded in, proceeded from and took-for-granted a 
heterogeneous patchwork of sense-making practices both ordinary and specialized. Like other 
aspects of everyday life, sociological reasoning too – the manner in which a world in 
common is made available through sociological work – was treated as a phenomenon 
amenable to study rather than the foundation upon which a ‘science’ could be built (see 
Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock 2008). Sociological practice was, therefore, seen as 
accountable in its details and explicable as such. Insofar as this led to attempts to specify how 
sociology could be made investigable as an ‘assemblage’ of practices, ethnomethodology 
both anticipated and helped set the scene for the current empirical ‘turn to method’.  
 
Secondly, and connected to the first, the abiding ‘preference’ in such studies was to begin 
with the host of ‘troubles’ that accompany attempts to arrive at (locally) ‘adequate’ accounts 
of the social world. For example, in Garfinkel’s (1967:18–24) ‘coding’ study, graduate 
students were asked to code clinic records on patient intake and discharge according to fixed 
instructions. In a move repeated within contemporary empirical work on methods, rather than 
approach coding in straightforwardly instrumental terms, as a device for generating results, 
Garfinkel shifted attention to what was involved in coding-according-to-the-instructions. That 
is, Garfinkel was interested in investigating the ‘actual activities’ involved in following these 
instructions. In order to do this, Garfinkel enforced strict compliance with the instructions, 
urging the coders to use no other resource when making decisions about how any given item 
was to be coded. He found the coders were unable to make decisions on this basis while 
remaining confident that they were coding their materials correctly. The coders had both to 
work out what they were supposed to do to stick to the coding procedures and assess whether 
doing so captured the sense of the clinic files as records. The investigators did not (because 
they could not) operate on a strictly formal basis. Instead, they employed various ad hocing 
practices (such as ‘et ceterea’, ‘unless’, and ‘let it pass’) to fulfil what the instructions were 
talking about ‘after all’. Rather than characterising these ad hoc responses to the troubles 
generated by strict adherence as flawed, Garfinkel insisted that they were essential and 
required for understanding the instructions in the first place:  
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To treat instructions as though ad hoc features in their use were a 
nuisance, or to treat their presence as grounds for complaint about the 
incompleteness of instructions, is very much like complaining that if 
the walls of a building were only gotten out of the way one could see 
better what was keeping the roof up. (1967: 22) 
 
Unsurprisingly, this focus on ‘trouble-making’ phenomena within the social sciences has 
often been interpreted as a way of making trouble for the social sciences (Garfinkel 2002). 
There is something to this. Nonetheless, despite ‘sceptical’ readings of ethnomethodology 
stemming from just such a view, as in Woolgar’s (1988) derivation of a series of 
‘methodological horrors’, there is more to the ethnomethodological concern with sociological 
troubles than this. For Garfinkel, it is not that social science cannot make reference to the 
world. The interesting question is rather how reference is achieved and achieved 
satisfactorily, practically speaking, something which involves looking in detail at the various 
decisions that social scientists have to make when working with their, often unpromising, 
materials. 
 
For ethnomethodology, troubles and their management are, then, constitutive features of 
research practices in the social sciences. They are woven into the very fabric of social 
scientists’ practices and the development of the forms of competence upon which they rest. 
Adapting Jordan and Fuller (1975), we might say that ‘the problematic features of ... [the 
research situation] provide the raw materials for negotiating its hazards’ (17) and ‘though 
fraught with hazard ... [what is notable is that the research] does not, by and large, break 
down’ (24). The presence of troubles and the production of the ad hoc, locally devised ‘fixes’ 
required to deal with them are not, therefore, the social sciences’ ‘dirty’ secret but their 
praxeological grounds.  
 
It is worth stressing this point, as it is liable to be misunderstood. For ethnomethodology, 
following Garfinkel, the specific troubles research throws up are not to be explained away as 
regrettable lapses on the part of individual researchers or used to impugn the work they do. 
Within ethnomethodology, focusing on the troubles that arise in research does not, therefore, 
constitute a backdoor form of critique, a way of drawing a dividing line between research 
which is good and research which is bad that has been implicitly leveraged by appealing to 
some standard of methodological purity that constrains the practice from the ‘outside’. As 
discussed by Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), the focus on troubles is not evaluative at all, but 
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descriptive: one more or less useful way of learning about what researchers do, and do 
routinely, as part of the work of satisfying themselves that they have been able to proceed as 
their chosen methods suggest. Within research practice, the question of what it might mean to 
follow a particular standard of ‘good practice’ correctly is itself an open-ended question that 
cannot be decided independently of the practical situations in which the question might arise 
with reference to the standard alone. While studies of sociological practice couched in these 
terms may stand at odds with (some) idealized depictions of such matters, and there is 
certainly a debate to be had on what exactly those depictions offer, it does not, we would 
suggest, clash with researchers’ understanding of what it is involved in putting prescriptive 
accounts to work and chimes with the current interest in reorienting to ‘method’, not as 
description or prescription, picture or rule, but as something itself embedded and made 
perspicuous within the local forms of social and cultural practice that provide the setting for 
sociological research.  
 
It is precisely these issues that we intend to take up in the empirical case studies and 
discussion which follow.  
Topicalizing	method:	two	exemplary	settings	for	a	study	of	analytical	work		
The examples we go on to discuss below embody the kinds of troubles researchers engaged 
in social scientific investigations routinely grapple with in the process of producing analyses 
of the social world. They also, more importantly, point to the centrality of troubles and their 
management to the enterprise of social research. They are drawn from a comparative 
observational study of the working practices of researchers located in two units within a 
multi-institution, interdisciplinary UK social science methods initiative explicitly set-up to 
encourage methodological innovation and experimentation: one group involved in qualitative 
research, the other in quantitative research.ii Involved in quite different disciplines and 
substantive areas of inquiry, the two groups had no contact prior to their involvement in the 
initiative and, with only limited past exposure, knew very little about the kinds of work the 
other was engaged in. However, having being brought together though the various collective 
events that were part of the initiative, members of both groups became interested in one-
another’s work and, in the spirit of the wider initiative, began to discuss the possibility of 
collaboration. Despite this, establishing what the possible bases for collaboration could be 
proved difficult in the absence of an understanding of each other’s research and so, based on 
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what Rabinow (1996: xiii) has referred to as ‘reflected curiosity’, the decision was made to 
approach an independent group of researchers, we the authors, to undertake an 
ethnomethodological study of work that would offer an account of aspects of both group’s 
methodic practices – an offer we were happy to take up.  
 
The difficult question arises as to the possible grounds for such a comparison. We were 
dealing with two very different sets of research practices: one was highly mathematical and 
statistical in character, the other much more concerned with talk, text, artefacts and the 
experiences they might be said to index. There were also obvious and important ‘structural’ 
differences between the two groups: differences of disciplinary and institutional location, 
bibliographies, orientations, audiences, materials (instruments and data), techniques, domains 
of expertise, substantive topics addressed, products, forms of collaboration, organisation and 
management of time, resources, personnel, skills, and more besides. In terms of interpreting 
our instructions, thinking about these differences took us back to the aim of our study, what 
we could see ourselves as having been invited to do, namely, provide a description of each to 
the other. There were two aspects to this. Firstly, we wanted to find out what the researchers 
involved were trying to do and how; and secondly, we wanted to be in a position to 
communicate what we had been able to learn about what were quite specialized forms of 
research practice to those we could not assume had anything but a passing acquaintance with 
the kinds of research each group was doing – the position we were in before the research 
began. Rather than set ourselves up as authoritative interpreters, we thus saw ourselves much 
more as ‘translators’ or ‘go-betweens’ helping to make some aspects of the work that would 
otherwise remain difficult to grasp more accessible. And this, as we saw it, meant attempting 
to understand and describe the organization of these practices in their own terms with the 
researchers as our guides.  
 
We claim no special status for our account. As one reviewer put it, we watched people at 
work, talked to them and read some of the work they drew on as well as produced in order to 
follow what was going on – quite so. Like anyone confronted with an unfamiliar activity, we 
sought to learn what was going on from those engaged in these activities in what are entirely 
unremarkable, commonplace ways – exactly the same ways in which someone who so wished 
could learn about our investigative practices. Our account has utility insofar as it allows 
others to follow those activities too – while we and those we presented the work to felt we 
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managed this tolerably well, it is up to our readers to decide how successful we have been in 
that regard. 
 
We were aided in this because a focus on ‘methods’ was a particularly visible feature of each 
group’s work. The work of both groups was methodologically as well as substantively-
focused and their empirical research was used for illustrative purposes to show the strengths 
and weaknesses of approaching particular topics in particular ways. However, these were not 
meta-methodological exercises but attempts to show the utility of methods-in-use, their value 
for particular practical research ends. In the case of the qualitative researchers, the aim was to 
demonstrate how a range of methods – interviewing, observation, maps, focus groups and the 
use of various elicitation devices (photographs, video, music, etc). – could add depth to and 
so enrich understandings of interpersonal relationships, particularly when used in 
combination. In the case of the quantitative researchers, the aim was to demonstrate that 
Bayesian statistical work could be used to expand the statistical techniques social scientists 
routinely use – allowing them to get more out of data with less. These claims were made with 
appropriate caveats: these were pleas for methodological pluralism rather than the superiority 
of any single approach, including those the researchers themselves employed. Working to a 
remit which explicitly topicalized questions of method, then, these units provided us with two 
exemplary settings for an investigation of methodological practice in social scientific work.  
 
More specifically, and as we shall go on to discuss in more detail, the manner in which they 
dealt with the troubles they encountered proved particularly useful when it came to learning 
about what was involved in their work (for more background see Greiffenhagen, Mair and 
Sharrock 2011). We are not interested in evaluating how successful they were in pursuing 
their projects – while others will no doubt choose to draw their own conclusions, we don’t 
see on the basis of the research we were able to conduct, how we could – but rather in 
developing an account of what they were doing.  
 
Spread over five months, our research involved fifty days of fieldwork across both units, with 
opportunity to observe around ten working sessions involving team members in each site. We 
began the study at a point when the projects the units were organized around were, for the 
most part, already well underway. Most of the researchers involved in these projects – and 
there were around eight members of each team, with around four core members of full-time 
staff and four associate staff of varying seniority, experience and recognized areas of 
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expertise – had advanced beyond data collection (or acquisition) but had not yet reached the 
point where they were ready to publish results. Instead, they were at the intermediate 
analytical stage where the priority was to work out what their research could be relevantly 
said to have shown.  
 
As we had no direct access to it, we will not, therefore, talk about the process of gathering or 
acquiring the data. Nor, although we do have access to publications that came out of the work 
we were privy to, are we going to talk about published results. Our interest, instead, is in the 
analytical work they engaged in as part of the process of turning one into the other. We are 
interested, that is, in the ‘alchemy’ of practice (Livingston 1995), by which empirical ‘data’ 
were transformed into (and so constituted as) meaningful ‘findings’ and hence how 
something significant to a wider social science audience was leveraged from the largely 
unstructured textual and numerical materials the analysis began from. We are, in other words, 
working with an understanding of ‘method’ that encompasses more than simply data 
collection or writing but extends to a consideration of data’s local ‘analyzability’ (Sacks 
1974). 
 
We wish to stress that there is nothing mysterious about this process. Analytical work 
involves embodied, material and collaborative activities that can be followed (and engaged 
in) by those who have gained a familiarity with the practice. It involves work on the data, 
rather than in the head, and so is a public and witnessable activity rather than a set of private 
mental operations (e.g., Coulter 1989). As a consequence, it can be seen and described. 
Proceeding on that basis, in what follows, we want to do just that: describe examples of 
analytical work, and the troubles that arose as part of it, as engaged in by the researchers 
whose activities we were able to observe.  
 
We focus on two examples in particular. Each involves a different ‘species’ of trouble. In the 
first, taken from the qualitative group, the researchers grappled with problems connected to 
interviewee responses and, as a consequence, the open-ended interviewing practices which 
produced them. The second, from the quantitative group, involves the management of a data 
anomaly which could have raised questions about the statistical modelling work that provided 
the context in which the anomaly was discovered. In both cases these unforeseen problems 
were dealt with on an ad hoc basis, and satisfactorily for the researchers’ practical purposes 
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(purposes which included, importantly, anticipating the standards their work would be held to 
by the professional audiences to whom it would later be presentediii).  
 
We concentrate on these examples because they represented (momentary) disruptions to the 
research process which were specifically topicalized as ‘troubles’ by those involved, and 
because, in a ‘reflexive’ move, addressing them led the researchers involved to problematize 
aspects of their own ‘methodic’ practices. Rather than concentrate on troubles for trouble’s 
sake, and in line with what we see as Garfinkel’s original intentions, we suggest their 
identification and management provides insights into the wider forms of practice they became 
relevant as troubles within. In the course of our work, they were ‘tutorial phenomena’ 
(Garfinkel 2002) that enabled us to learn more about what doing social scientific research 
practically consisted in within these settings.iv We claim no more for our account than this. 
 
Troubles	with	interviews	
One of the most persistently troubling aspects of interviewing, particularly open-ended, 
unstructured interviewing, is the (un)trustworthiness of the data it generates. Put simply, 
people prove unreliable as sources of information, they rarely tell it like it is – at least not in 
the unqualified ways that researchers might initially hope for. More often than not, 
researchers find interview materials trouble the ‘experience-to-interview-to-text’ relationship 
(Briggs 2007: 575), rendering straightforward mappings between them problematic. Similar 
kinds of questions can be asked in similar kinds of ways without those questions being 
answered in a consistent way, sometimes even by the same person (Suchman and Jordan 
1990). Seemingly ‘straight’ questions, fail to elicit ‘straight’ answers. The ‘unreliability’ 
encountered in such cases is as much a product of the way of gathering information as it is a 
property of the information itself or, indeed, the informants themselves. The problems posed 
by interviews, in other words, are difficult to address via interviews. Faced with ‘unreliable’ 
interviews, due to the epistemological untrustworthiness of interview subjects, the problem 
becomes that of finding ways to locate research-relevant material within them despite the 
attendant problems. How this is done when a variant of this problem is encountered in 
practice provides the focus of our first example.  
 
The example is taken from an analysis session involving researchers in the qualitative 
research group. It involved L and C who met to develop an analysis of a small corpus of 
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open-ended interviews conducted as part of a larger project and who, in the process, 
encountered problems related to the trustworthiness of their own methods for capturing their 
respondents’ experiences. The purpose of the study had been to explore a particular group of 
individuals’ relationship networks over time in a residential estate on the outskirts of an 
English city. More specifically, it was designed to examine the negative, not just the positive, 
aspects of relationships with loved ones, neighbours, work colleagues and those located 
outside immediate kin, friendship and work circles.  
 
Part of a broader umbrella project, comprising eight different mini-projects, the goal was to 
add depth to what the researchers saw as an over-simplified view of relationships in the wider 
sociological literature and to highlight the restricted methodological repertoire on which that 
view was based. Beginning with the idea that relationships, particularly over extended 
periods of time, can require significant investments, socially, economically and emotionally, 
these studies were designed to tease out what they saw as the unacknowledged personal costs 
of maintaining those investments. Alongside such things as happiness or contentment, this 
group of studies was motivated by an interest in investigating relationships as sources of 
ambivalence, resentment, hostility, isolation and loss and so evaluate the different senses in 
which lives are ‘peopled’. Rather than accept the idea that relationships are straightforwardly 
‘good’ for people, sources of ‘social capital’, the researchers wanted to demonstrate that 
people themselves, when given the chance to talk in different, more extended ways by 
researchers, would supply ‘critical’ takes on the ways in which they lived their lives with 
others. A specific target was a certain form of sociologically-induced nostalgia and the survey 
methodologies used to ground it (as in, e.g., Putnam 2000). In the case of this particular mini-
project, the researchers hoped that, by gathering information across generational divides 
using open-ended interviewing techniques, they could show that relationships were as 
complicated and difficult in the past as they were in the present, thereby developing a fuller 
account of the realities of how lives are lived over time. 
 
Against this broad remit, L had conducted a total of eight interviews with people of an older 
generation, including joint interviews with married couples about their relationships. The 
interviews, which lasted for around two to three hours each, were conducted in the 
participants’ homes and L, as she reported to C at the start of the meeting, had been broadly 
satisfied when she had finished them (some months prior to this meeting) that they had 
provided the kinds of narrative materials they had been looking for. However, having 
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revisited the interviews for the first time since conducting them, in the opening phases of the 
meeting L voiced her frustration that they had not provided more, mainly because they had 
produced what might be thought of as conspicuously ‘plain’ accounts of what were exactly 
the kinds of ‘complicated’ personal matters their research was predicated upon finding, and 
which the interview format was thought to be the perfect vehicle for gaining access to. That 
the interviews had failed to elicit narratives that dealt head-on with the emotional 
complexities of the participants’ relationships was, therefore, troubling.  
 
Working with the transcripts and pressed by C to supply more detail, L discussed two specific 
examples. One case she singled out was that of Raymond and Christine, a couple in their 80s, 
interviewed jointly, who had both previously been married to each other’s best friends: 
Raymond had been best friends with Christine’s husband and Christine had been best friends 
with Raymond’s wife. Talking C through the story she was given in the interview, L 
explained that when their respective spouses died, they started to rely upon each other for 
support, and became close. When L had asked how they had moved from friendship to 
marriage, they explained that it seemed the most sensible thing to do. 
 
Excerpt 1 
 
 
In her discussion with C about how to make sense of Raymond and Christine’s story, how to 
think about it for the purpose of the analysis they were trying to develop, L’s suggestion (see 
excerpt one) was that there was, frustratingly, ‘probably more to it’. Whether a ‘romantic 
tale’ was there to be told or whether Raymond and Christine’s decision was a purely 
utilitarian one was left decidedly ambiguous and difficult to settle. As L saw it, the question 
of what it might mean to ‘marry your dead husband or wife’s best friend’ was directly 
relevant to the research but the interview provided limited insights into possible answers. On 
this first reading, the value of these interview materials given the aims of the study seemed, at 
minimum, debatable. 
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The problem of partial and incomplete testimony arose in relation to another of the interviews 
L and C went on to discuss. Here, however, the problems were compounded. As both L and 
C had independently noted prior to the meeting, the ‘one big story’ in this particular interview 
was the participant Gemma’s relationship with someone called Jilly. As L and C had 
interpreted the interview, Gemma and Jilly had been close friends, both young mothers 
raising families who had fallen out over an unspecified incident (but with the strong 
implication of infidelity on Jilly’s part) that led to Jilly leaving her husband and children and 
emigrating. What made the Jilly story problematic was that most of the interview with 
Gemma had been, from the researchers’ perspective, largely uninformative in terms of the 
problems they had hoped it would address. Gemma had mainly volunteered truisms about the 
importance of family and friends, emphasizing the good and downplaying the bad – the 
opposite of what the researchers were looking for. As C remarked in the course of their 
discussion: ‘she explicitly said, well, y’know I don’t have that many ups and downs to talk 
about in terms of relationships’. However, towards the end of the interview, Gemma had 
introduced and had gone on to talk about her relationship with Jilly, prefacing her remarks 
with ‘friends aren’t like they used to be’. Although never made entirely explicit, their joint 
readings led L and C to conclude that, despite their closeness, Gemma could not tolerate Jilly 
abandoning her husband and children and therefore cut all ties with her.  
 
Excerpt 2 
 
 
Reviewing the interview transcript, L and C noted that the Jilly story stood awkwardly 
against Gemma’s earlier assertion that she ‘never had ups and downs in her relationships’. 
However, this inconsistency was only part of the problem. In excerpt two above, L explains 
to C that she tried to get Gemma to talk more about Jilly but that it was not something she 
had found particularly easy. A little later, and in response, C commented: ‘I thought you did a 
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brilliant job of getting her to talk in the way she wanted to and you troubled her […] you 
really did a dance around her narrative. But she was still never going to say to you, well 
actually, y’know, on a deep emotional level I felt x, y, z’. While this was a recognition of L’s 
competence, it was also a restatement of the problem the interview posed: despite C’s best 
efforts, Gemma’s account was demonstrably incomplete. While the ‘complicated’ story came 
through in this case – as it had not in the interview with Raymond and Christine – the manner 
in which it did so gave L and C little additional scope for claiming it had done so in an 
unambiguous manner. Put simply, what exactly had happened and how Gemma felt about it 
was left vague and undefined.  
 
What came out of L and C’s observations on their first run through the transcripts was that, 
prima facie, the in-depth interviews thus guaranteed relevant data only haphazardly, failed to 
get at the crux of the particular issues they wanted to investigate and generated inconsistent, 
ambiguous results. These methodological troubles, troubles that have dogged the interview 
since it first became a staple feature of social science research (see, e.g., LaPiere 1934), were 
plain for the researchers to see. However, the very manner in which these troubles were 
posed also provided them with materials for dealing with them. 
 
In the rest of the session, as the researchers moved beyond the troubles their first readings 
had revealed, they began to piece together a solution that would enable them to use these 
materials to make their case. Rather than undermining the research process, they saw a way 
of treating the presence of these issues as affirming the value of the data they had gathered 
rather than the data they might conceivably have been said to have missed. Indeed, as their 
discussion continued, the fact that their interviews contained absences and inconsistencies 
came to be seen as making them especially rich for their purposes. Instead of treating the 
accounts they were given as incomplete, in a neat reversal, the researchers saw that they 
could be treated as expressions of the very phenomenon they were interested in exploring – 
namely, the ambiguities and sensitivities that surround our intimate relationships and the 
difficulties we face in talking frankly about them. In this way, the very ‘weaknesses’ a first 
reading and the initial discussion exposed became measures of the ‘strength’ of the methods 
they had employed – a move accomplished by shifting the locus of analytical interest from 
Raymond, Christine and Gemma’s relationships themselves to their ways of accounting for 
those relationships.  
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In working out ways of making do with these materials despite the methodological troubles 
they posed, L and C concluded that it was because of those troubles that the interviews 
provided them with what in fact they had been looking for all along. In this way, the practical 
process of locating and determining the troubles their work had given rise to furnished the 
researchers with the means to resolve and move past them in ways they were satisfied would 
prove of interest to the audiences the results of this analytical work would be presented to. It 
was, therefore, in these ways of working through the data that the interviews as ‘methods’ 
could be treated as producing research-relevant findings.  
 
Troubles	with	models	
Methodological troubles are not just a feature of qualitative research they also plague 
quantitative research – the focus of our second case. Despite being organized, drilled and 
disciplined in various ways, the data processed by statisticians’ models may nonetheless 
refuse to tell the desired analytical story as and when required. Instead, difficult to diagnose 
glitches, inconsistencies and anomalies emerge which interfere with the presentation of 
results. Lakatos (1976) suggested that a typical first step when confronted with 
methodological troubles of this kind is to simply ‘bar the monster[s]’ from the outset, i.e., to 
find a way of proceeding that obviates the need to consider them at all (see also Woolgar 
1988; Star and Gerson 1987). In what follows, we pick up this second troubling 
methodological theme, and examine the ways in which the manner of their appearance 
provides resources for ensuring they can be kept safely out of view. 
  
The example is taken from our work with the second of the two units we studied, the unit 
involved in quantitative data analysis (see also Mair, Greiffenhagen, and Sharrock 
forthcoming). While working with social scientists, the researchers working in this unit 
defined themselves as statisticians and had backgrounds in formal rather than substantive 
disciplines, i.e. disciplines like mathematics and bioinformatics. As is the case with 
statisticians more generally, their involvement in primary data collection was limited. Instead, 
their work typically began after surveys had been conducted, data entered and databases 
constructed, when they were called in to do the calculative work needed to ascertain and 
exploit the deeper ‘affordances’ of these complex numerical artefacts. They were involved in 
four main projects, each designed to find ways of bringing advanced statistical modelling 
techniques to bear on methodological problems within the social sciences (i.e. longitudinal 
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analysis, spatio-temporal comparison, data synthesis and bias estimation), and they used a 
range of ‘applications’ (i.e. datasets relating to a range of phenomena selected on the basis of 
characteristics that made them especially suitable for the task at hand) as test-grounds for the 
statistical ‘tools’ they were seeking to develop.  
 
The trouble we shall focus on arose as part of one of these projects: modelling for spatio-
temporal comparison. As part of this project, the researchers wanted to take data on temporal 
changes in the frequency of such things as, for example, cases of a specific illness over time, 
and combine it with data on the spatial distribution of cases of that illness in order to trial and 
showcase their modelling techniques. Their models were being designed in such a way that 
they would allow the identification of general trends from year to year across all the areas 
their data covered, but with a capacity not only to identify particular areas which deviated 
from the general trend but also to enable them to specify by how much. Though the model 
was designed to be general purpose, its development had been based on work with specific 
datasets, one of which contained data on cases of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) across the different regions of the UK. The models under construction were tested 
using the datasets to check whether they produced the expected results.  
 
Unlike the previous case, the meeting that we concentrate on took place in the closing stages 
of this particular project. The two researchers involved, J and M, had been working on the 
general problem as well as the substantive applications for some time and the purpose of the 
meeting was to determine whether the model they had built could be ‘finalized’ and written 
up for publication. In their immediately prior meeting (one we also attended) some aspects of 
the model had been questioned, and one of the researchers (J) had undertaken significant 
work to refine it in response. The two were meeting to sign off this work, and agree that they 
could now proceed to the applications rather than undertake any further specifically model-
related work. J, as the researcher on the project, had made sure M had been sent results of the 
testing he had been doing well in advance of the meeting, and the discussion centred on what 
he thought the various graphs and plots he had produced showed. Before getting into that, 
however, J offered a summary of what he had done – noting, as he did so, a trouble that had 
arisen between the last meeting and this. 
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Excerpt 3 
 
 
In this excerpt, J starts by saying that the materials he is about to go through on the computer 
show the final models ‘in action’, i.e., applied to the COPD data. For the researchers, one of 
the model’s main ‘selling points’ in terms of applications (as opposed to the statistical 
accomplishment of combining spatial and temporal data ‘robustly’) was that it could be used 
to detect policy effects. What made the COPD data particularly useful in this regard was that 
it covered a period which included a change of legislation in 1992 when the rules covering 
who could qualify for compensation for work-related COPD were relaxed, making it easier 
for those who had contracted COPD through their work (miners, for example) to claim 
financial support. Given the added financial incentives associated with a confirmed diagnosis 
of COPD, the researchers wanted to see if there was a spike in cases at any time post-1992 in 
areas where work-related COPD had historically been a particular issue (mining 
communities, for example) as people sought medical certification in order to qualify for 
compensation. The policy change in 1992 was, thus, an ‘event’ the researchers suspected 
would impact differently on disease trends in specific areas and so could be used to both 
calibrate and demonstrate the capabilities of their model. Prior to this meeting, they had been 
looking at changes across a twenty year period, using two ten-year datasets (from 1990 to 
1999 and 2000 to 2009), but in excerpt one J explains that he had to change this to a sixteen 
year period, using two eight year datasets (from 1990 to 1997 and 1998 to 2005), due to a 
difficulty he had encountered, something M at this stage seems to accept. Later in the session, 
however, the same issue came up again, with M asking J for much more detail: 
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Excerpt 4 
 
 
While J’s revised ‘time pattern’ still covered the 1992 policy change and a significant period 
afterwards, the problem was that, in principle, the model ought to have worked with any 
stretch of data. Decades are merely conventional units for marking time and are largely 
selected for aesthetic rather than formal reasons. However, elaborating on the difficulty first 
hinted at in excerpt 1, in excerpt 2 J explains that he discovered a ‘non-convergence’ problem 
when he tried to use one of the ten-year datasets they had been using up till then (1990–1999) 
with the new models (i.e., the algorithm did not come to an end, but ran on indefinitely 
without completing its computational task). When he switched to using the two eight-year 
datasets, however, things worked perfectly well. The ten year span may have been considered 
preferable on conventional grounds, but the results of running numerous tests on the data 
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with the models had shown everything else was as it should have been and, indeed, had been 
before.  
 
Although the ‘fix’ worked, it did not do quite enough to satisfy M, who questioned J further. 
One of M’s suggestions was that there might have been a problem with the data for the 
additional two years (line 10). The problem was she could not work out why this might have 
been the case (line 13). In order to understand what might have bothered M, it is worth 
setting out the formal characteristics of this trouble in more detail, putting it in the context of 
the history of the project more broadly. Schematically, we can present things as follows: 
 
Figure I: Overview of the research process 
 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Model Initial Model  Intermediate Model  Final Model 
Data 10 + 10 years  10 + 10 years 8 + 8 years 
 
Figure I breaks the research process down into two parallel streams of activity: the work on 
the model and the work on the application. The work on the models had gone through three 
iterations: it began with an initial model, it proceeded through a whole series of more and 
more refined intermediate models, and it culminated in the final model (or set of models), 
ready to be presented to a professional audience. In parallel with each of the stages, a process 
covering around a year and a half, the models had been tested with ten year stretches of data, 
taken from the COPD and other ‘model’ datasets, without any problems whatsoever. It was 
only after the final changes had been made to their model that the non-convergence problem 
arose. Just as the logic underpinning the model had been settled to the satisfaction of both J 
and M, this application (but not others) had been thrown out of kilter.  
 
The presence of a ‘non-convergence’ problem around the ten-year span might conceivably 
have led to questions about other elements of their work, potentially raising doubts about 
their hardware, the bespoke statistical programmes they were using or even the proper 
functioning of the model itself. The failure to process a data-set the model ought to have been 
able to cope with perfectly adequately might therefore have been used to open up a modelling 
process the researchers now considered closed (see here Latour and Woolgar 1979: 77–85). 
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However, the issue, as such, was not seriously entertained. They had isolated a component 
which, when reconfigured, led their statistical apparatus to behave as it had done before. The 
question as to whether it was the data, the programming and code or the new features of the 
model that was causing the problem was not categorically settled. There was no need. The 
work-around solution of ‘running’ two smaller data-sets together (see Figure II) rather than 
two slightly larger ones was seen as sufficient, and in the meeting they both agreed that there 
was no reason for thinking, given that it did work, that there might be something wrong 
elsewhere. From what they could see, nothing important to the modelling hinged on the 
data’s anomalous behaviour: the model would neither stand nor fall on the basis of what to all 
extents and purposes looked like a glitch. Given that they had a fix, an inelegant one but a 
solution nonetheless, the investigators were thus happy to move forward on the basis that if 
they were to look into the matter further, anomalies would turn up in the 1998–1999 data 
when processed within a ten-year dataset. That they could proceed was enough, then, for 
them to proceed, with the 16 year span sufficient to demonstrate the capabilities of the model.  
 
Figure II: Some different ways of adding time 
 
10-Year Blocks 
possibility (a): 1980–1989 + 1990–1999 + 2000–2009 + ... 
possibility (b): 1981–1990 + 1991–2000 + 2001–2010 + ...
 
8-Year Time Blocks 
1990–1997 + 1998–2005 + 2006–2013 + ... 
 
What we have here, then, is another instance where the methodic and conscientious 
application of a ‘method’ to ‘data’ generates inconsistent results (a model that could run over 
two eight-year datasets but not two ten-year ones), but where the process of diagnosing the 
trouble also pointed the way to a practically adequate remedy (running two smaller stretches 
of data together). Faced with the non-convergence problem with the ten year dataset, J 
wanted to see whether it worked with less data, an eight-year dataset, and it did: diagnostic 
and solution are here one and the same. J’s subsequent reassurances regarding the tests he had 
run were enough to convince M that it was the data (in a way that did not need to be specified 
or indeed investigated further) which was problematic. Had the fix not worked, there would 
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have been a problem. It did work, however, and, although the problem was not resolved, they 
could move on.  
 
We see this example as a counterpart to the previous case-study. The major difference 
between the two cases is that, whereas the researchers in the first case proceeded by 
foregrounding problems with their methods, recasting them as strengths, in this case the 
researchers worked to make sure potential frailties need not have to be given serious 
consideration. As Garfinkel put it, there are ‘practices for locating monsters but there are also 
practices for burying them’ (Hill and Crittenden 1968: 213). What we would like to point out, 
following Garfinkel, is that monster-burying is not a matter of ‘epistemological deception’, of 
deluding oneself or others. Rather, and in line with the arguments we have presented thus far, 
these ad hoc resolutions are what allow researchers to address problems as and when they 
arise and so make their methods work and, from there, their results count.  
Conclusion	
In the course of the Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology (Hill and Crittenden 1968), 
Garfinkel became involved in a series of tetchy exchanges with the non-ethnomethodologists 
who had convened to find out more about what ethnomethodology might have to say to them. 
One of those exchanges was with the survey researcher David Gold: 
 
Gold:  [W]e have methods by which we can determine ... an unreliable 
response or a systematically untrue response ... 
Garfinkel: Quite right! No question! The thing I keep getting back to 
however ... is how the work actually gets done. That is the only 
thing of interest. That it is a practical kind of activity is the thing 
that is of interest ... There are rules of good procedure, of course. 
We relax those rules; nevertheless, though they were relaxed, the 
rules will have been counted as having been followed. That is a 
phenomenon. Ethnomethodologically, that is a phenomenon. 
(Hill and Crittenden 1968: 193–198) 
 
This response by Garfinkel, like a later remark in which he suggests an equivalence between 
the methods of social research and the methods of Zande divination, is certainly provocative. 
However, it is not merely provocative. What Garfinkel highlights is that for 
ethnomethodology the interest is that the work gets done in spite of attendant problems and, 
as a consequence, the focus becomes investigating how this is accomplished. Garfinkel is not 
asserting the impossibility of social science, but rather pointing to an alternative conception 
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of what it consists in, one in which ‘social science practice’ is not determined by, or 
coextensive with, ‘rules of good procedure’. That is not to say ‘rules of good procedure’, i.e. 
methods, have no relevance in social science, but, rather, that they should not be treated as 
decontextualised descriptions of research practice – where one substitutes for the other. 
Instead, as we have tried to show, their relation to research practice is contingent, they are 
invoked and brought into play locally, ‘for all practical purposes’, by researchers in the 
course of what they do and in the course of the troubles they encounter along the way.  
 
We believe it is important to return to these ethnomethodological concerns because attending 
to methodological troubles and their management, to our minds, helps clarify what it could 
mean to talk about ‘methods’ as practical features of social scientists’ work. In treating 
methods as social and cultural phenomena in and of themselves, with their own biographies 
and ‘personal’ entanglements – as in discussions of the history of the survey, the interview, 
the focus group, and so on – we see a danger that the recent ‘empirical studies’ of social 
science methods may encourage ‘methodological hagiography’, with the history of social 
science rewritten, no longer as the lives of ‘great men’, but as the lives of ‘great methods’ 
(whether heroic, villainous or otherwise, see e.g. Law 2009; Majima and Moore 2009; Law, 
Ruppert and Savage 2011; Savage 2013). The examples we have chosen to examine in this 
article allow us to see why granting autonomy to method, a contemporary reworking of the 
mythological conception of the methodology of the social sciences (with the focus not on the 
significance of the researcher but the techniques they employ), is liable to end up in 
confusion. This is because the existence of troubles, and the fringe of ad hoc practices that 
they extend out into, call into question the idea that there is any fixed ‘thing’ – the method – 
to write a biography of. Put slightly differently, we agree that social scientific research 
practices constitutes a legitimate domain of inquiry, we just don’t agree, following Garfinkel, 
that taking references to the centrality of methods within those practices at face value 
represents a good way of proceeding to examine it.  
 
The examples we examined were taken, quite deliberately, from familiar research situations – 
discussions between researchers about how to analyse data – settings which require little 
explanation or prior tutelage to grasp (see Lynch 1993). Despite the fact, to borrow from 
Anderson and Sharrock, that ‘[there] is nothing difficult or arcane in them’, the ‘trivialness of 
the examples should not mislead us into thinking that the practices they evince are trivial, for 
they are not’ (Anderson and Sharrock 1993: 150). Instead, as we hope their familiarity 
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underscores, the troubles they ‘evince’ are the very stuff of methodical research practice in 
the social sciences. As such they provide us with insights into the wider working contexts 
such troubles acquire their salience within, namely research as a practical enterprise centred 
on arriving at analyses which are ‘good enough’ – contrary to what many think, a far from 
trivial matter.  
 
The failure to take account of the open texture of practices within which ‘methods’ acquire 
their abidingly troubled salience for social research means the picture we have of them is 
necessarily incomplete. What Garfinkel insisted on was that methodological troubles are not 
inconvenient problems, they are the phenomenon, central to determining what talk of 
‘method’ could possibly mean in the local context and developing historicity of researchers’ 
work together. It is researchers’ ad hoc invocations of shared understandings, relative to their 
background knowledge of the ‘social structures’ they are investigating and, crucially, the 
social organization of their own inquiries, including the wider requirements their analyses 
must demonstrably meet and the competences they must demonstrably display, that enable 
them to satisfy themselves that they have correctly identified how things are – both where 
their procedures have been deemed to be satisfied and where they have been deviated from 
for ‘good reasons’. Insofar as social studies are treated as accounts of empirical features of 
the social world, then the capacity of any method to yield this is achieved in and over the 
course of the inquiry, unavoidably in and through its specifics.  
 
We believe this comes across strongly in our cases and we hope we have adequately 
conveyed the footwork required to resolve the troubles and move on in each case. In finding 
ways of dealing with their problems, problematic interviews and misbehaving data, both sets 
of researchers ended up clarifying what they were after all along: not complete descriptions 
of personal relationships or pleasing graphs of decades of change, but an analysis of the 
difficulties people have in talking about their relationships and the differential effects of 
policy changes across space and time. In neither case was the research compromised, we 
would suggest, but strengthened, in the researchers’ own terms, as a result of encountering 
troubles. Moreover, and this is perhaps the nub of the matter, it was precisely the manner of 
the appearance of the troubles they encountered that provided the researchers with the means 
for overcoming them. Understanding analytical work and methods work more broadly, then, 
hinges upon, and in determinate ways, an understanding of the troubles it is intertwined with. 
The exchange from the Purdue Symposium encapsulates the shift in perspective involved in 
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orienting to troubles in this way: while Gold sees troubles as methodological problems, 
Garfinkel sees them as internal to sociological inquiries, the normal troubles of investigative 
work.  
 
Based upon the above, we might say that the idea that sociological inquiries rest upon 
methods and associated doctrines is a way of talking that glosses the capacity of sociologists 
to speak of factual states in the social world, one which is associated with a thoroughly 
practical – but largely almost entirely unofficial – understanding of the practical 
organizational conditions that govern in situ determinations of what can (as concretely as 
possible) be said about what has been found, observed, understood, etc. Two further points 
emerge from this. Firstly, it is an illustration of Garfinkel’s analysis of compliance with 
general procedures in specific settings: namely, that the demands of the present situation 
always take priority in decisions about how general procedures are to be applied. And, 
secondly, the realization of this fact in actual research practice does not instantiate ‘bad 
practice’ or in any way – additional to those that might trouble researchers themselves – 
invalidate what they do. Rather, it only reinforces Garfinkel’s central contention, that such 
prioritizing is not a setback but merely a realistically necessary feature of getting research 
done at all.  
 
While research is not a free for all where anything goes, we do not think much progress has 
been made in terms of getting to its organization in practical settings. As set out here, we 
think orienting to troubles is one way in which that could be profitably pursued. This brings 
us to what we regard as the central difference between ethnomethodological studies of 
method in the social sciences and the more recent body of science and technology inspired 
studies. Unlike the laboratory studies of the 1980s, to which ethnomethodology and, for 
instance, actor-network theory, made such distinctive contributions (Lynch 2011), current 
work on social science methods has not retained the focus on in-depth studies of hands-on 
research practice, instead treating accounts of methods as proxies for those practices. The 
ethnomethodological focus on troubles is salutary in this regard as it demonstrates that there 
is always more to research practice than such accounts allow. If studies of social science 
methods are to illuminate the practices they speak of, we suggest that the question largely 
lacking a sociological answer is not ‘what is the role of sociology’s methods in the wider 
society?’ but ‘what is the actual role of sociology’s methods in sociology?’  
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i We do not wish to suggest that ethnomethodology is or ever was a neatly unified field of 
inquiry. There are, for example, important differences between the positions of Garfinkel 
(1967), Sacks (1992) and Cicourel (1964) as well as subsequent ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts. Cicourel’s work, for instance, was partly predicated on developing a 
programme that would, on an interventionist footing, seek to positively address the 
methodological problems that beset the social sciences. Garfinkel and Sacks, by contrast, 
stressed their ‘indifference’ to resolving sociology’s unending troubles with method 
(Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). For Garfinkel and Sacks, those troubles were topics to be studied 
not problems to be remedied practically, methodologically or theoretically (see Lynch 1993). 
At the same time, however, neither Garfinkel nor Sacks pursued investigations of 
sociological practice in the same way. While we concentrate on Garfinkel’s position here, it 
would not do to overplay the differences either. There are recognizable continuities in play 
too and anyone interested in ethnomethodology’s long-running concern in social scientific 
practice, an interest which has given rise to all manner of studies over time, will doubtless 
find many lines of ‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein 1953) running through the large body 
of empirical studies of sociological practice that have been conducted by 
ethnomethodologists since the 1960s (see Mair, Greiffenhagen and Sharrock 2013).  
ii We have no intention of scoping the state of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods 
here (see, e.g., Bryman 1988; Bergman 2008). We would note, however, that discussion of 
those issues has been largely programmatic (even where programmatics have been 
disavowed, see e.g. Gane 2012; Savage 2013), divorced from a consideration of the sites, 
settings and disciplinary situations in which qualitative and quantitative researchers ply their 
trades – our primary concern in this article.  
iii We do not deny that researchers’ work is held to particular standards and they orient to 
those standards within their work. How their peers would receive their work was undoubtedly 
a major consideration in the cases we examined – they reminded each other of this while 
doing their work. However, the standards that might be said to be demanded of them had to 
be worked out in relation to the courses of inquiry they were actually engaged in as they 
engaged in them. There was, as it were, no pre-formulated, inquiry-independent protocol that 
could be appealed to for an answer to that question. Working out what was expected of them 
in terms of ‘standards of good practice’ was not fixed but itself determined in the course of 
what they did before they engaged with wider audiences.  
iv In line with what we saw as the remit of our study, we presented these examples to the 
researchers in both groups. Although we were asked to anonymize these cases, both sets of 
researchers were relaxed about the focus on troubles in the broad and our description of these 
troubles in the narrow, acknowledging their presence as features of the research process. 
Anonymity was not requested because the researchers felt there was anything to hide but 
because of overlaps between the data we examine here and data examined in publications 
from the projects, something the researchers involved felt might lead to confusion.  
